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RELEASE PENDING APPEAL: A NARROW DEFINITION OF
"SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION" UNDER THE BAIL
REFORM ACT OF 1984
INTRODUCTION

A new federal Bail Reform Act (BRA or Act)' was enacted in 1984.2

By toughening the standards for granting bail, the new BRA reflects a
dramatic shift from the previous policy of favoring release. The BRA

changed the requirements for allowing bail pending disposition of an appeal from a criminal conviction. The new Act requires a convicted de-

fendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment to
demonstrate, among other things, that his appeal involves a "substantial

question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new

trial."3 Controversy has erupted in the federal courts over how much
merit is required for a question to be substantial in this context. Some
circuits have defined "substantial" as "fairly debatable." 4 Others reject
that definition and instead require a "close question" in the defendant's

appeal.5

Some courts have suggested that the two definitions do not significantly differ.6 Real distinctions do exist, however. Those courts adopt1.Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 202-210, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976-87
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3150 (West 1985)).
2. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Title II of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976, 1976-87 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.). The Act became effective
on October 12, 1984. Id. at 2199.
3. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(b)(2) (West 1985). The new criteria for release pending
appeal have been expressly incorporated into the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
which provide that the "decision as to release pending appeal shall be made in accordance
with Title 18, U.S.C. § 3143." Fed. R. App. P. 9(c). The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure have also incorporated the new law. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(c).
Section 3143 treats release pending sentencing and release pending appeal differently.
Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(a) (West 1985) ("Release or detention pending sentence")
with id. § 3143(b) ("Release or detention pending appeal by the defendant"). Also
treated separately is release pending review of an appeal by the government. See id. §
3143(c). In such a situation, the applicant's release is determined by the more liberal
standards used for pretrial defendants. See id.; 3A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 767, at 20 (Supp. 1985). This Note limits its discussion to bail pending appeal of
a criminal conviction and sentence. A release in such a situation "runs until the final
termination of the proceedings in all courts." 3A C. Wright, supra, § 767, at 140 (2d ed.
1982).
4. See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985). Some courts
have defined "substantial question" as "fairly doubtful." See, e.g., United States v.
Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Di~lauro, 614 F. Supp. 461, 465
(D. Me. 1985). According to Handy, which post-dates Miller, the two definitions are
interchangeable. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1283.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985); United States
v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227,
1231-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11 th Cir.
1985) (per curiam).
6. See United States v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 106 S.Ct.
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ing the close question definition apply a more stringent standard for

judging the merit of the appeal. 7 Determining which definition better

comports with legislative purpose is essential if the goals of the Act are to
be executed faithfully. Furthermore, courts need an appropriate and
workable guideline for applying the new standard. 8 Guidelines are especially important to district courts deciding motions for release9 because

reviewing courts give great deference to these initial determinations on
appeal.10
This Note examines the standard for defining a "substantial question."
Part I traces the history of the conflicting interests in the context of bail
pending appeal and the priorities that these interests have taken in the
constantly changing law. Part II discusses the language of the BRA of
1984 and the recent interpretations of section 3143(b) on bail pending

appeal. Finally, Part III examines congressional intent in enacting the
new BRA, differentiates between the two interpretations of "substantial
question," and determines that "close question" implies a stricter standard than "fairly debatable." This Note concludes that the "close question" standard should be applied in determining substantiality of the
question in order to satisfy congressional intent.

I.

RELEVANT HISTORY OF BAIL REFORM AND THE STANDARDS FOR
BAIL PENDING APPEAL

The historical meaning of bail in the criminal context is security deposited with a court to ensure a defendant's future appearance before
533 (1985); United States v. Hicks, 611 F. Supp. 497, 500 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (mem.).
The court in Randell, however, stated a preference for the close question definition. See
Randell, 761 F.2d at 125.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. In the past courts have been given wide discretion in deciding bail cases. See
United States v. Iacullo, 225 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1955) (quoting Williamson v. United
States, 184 F.2d 280, 281 (Jackson, Circuit Justice 1950)). However, since the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, §§ 2-6, 80 Stat. 214-217 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3146-3152 (1982)), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 203,
98 Stat. 1976, 1976, the courts' discretion is effectively limited to considerations of the
risk of the defendant's flight and the risk that he will endanger the community. See
United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1979).
9. See Fed. R. App. P. 9(b) (applications for bail pending appeal "shall be made in
the first instance in the district court").
10. See Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1232 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971);
United States v. Blyther, 407 F.2d 1279, 1280 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 953 (1969); Carbo v. United States, 302 F.2d 456, 457 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
Of course, the federal appellate courts must make independent determinations of bail
issues. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3141(b) (West 1985); see Harris,404 U.S. at 1232; Sellers v. United
States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 37-38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968); Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct.
994, 995 (Warren, Circuit Justice 1962); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 92-93
(3d Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 954 (10th Cir. 1985)
(considerable deference should be given for substantiality of questions of fact, but independent consideration of questions of law can be made by court of appeals).
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that court." The bail system still provides a means of preventing the
accused or convicted defendant from fleeing the court's constructive custody. 2 This Note focuses on whether a convicted defendant will be permitted conditional release from confinement at all.'a
Throughout the history of bail pending appeal, the judiciary and the
legislature have had to balance the competing interests of the defendant
and society. 4 The defendant's interests in being released on bail include
freedom pending judicial review,' 5 a desire to prepare one's case effi-

ciently,' 6 and avoidance of the potential hardships of prison." The soci-

etal interests in denying bail to one convicted of a crime include

preventing the defendant from fleeing the court's custody,' 8 protecting

the community from potential danger, 9 and avoiding delay in punishment.2" The bail bond system, together with the imposition of other specific conditions of a defendant's release, was intended as one compromise
of these conflicting interests. 2 The standards for granting and denying

release have changed over the years, reflecting shifts in the weight that
Congress accords these conflicting interests. A consideration of the
changing balance is essential to an understanding of the current trend in
release.
11. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Lay & De La Hunt, The Bail Reform Act
of 1984: A Discussion, 11 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 929, 931 (1985).
12. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). This concept applies to bail in both the
pretrial and the appeal phases of a criminal case. See Garvey v. United States, 292 F.
591, 593 (2d Cir. 1923).
13. The BRA refers to "release" rather than "bail," see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3150
(West 1985), in order to differentiate between a money bond and the granting of release
subject to certain conditions, one of which is the deposit. Powers, Detention Under the
FederalBail Reform Act of 1984, 21 Crim. L. Bull. 413, 414 (1985). For the purposes of
the Note, however, the terms "bail" and "release" are used interchangeably.
14. See United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (D.N.M. 1985); United
States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.N.J. 1934). The conflict is one between two
incompatible principles. A convicted person should not have to be imprisoned if he
might later be declared innocent. At the same time, there should be no undue delay
between a crime and its punishment. See Austin, 614 F. Supp. at 1212; Delaney, 8 F.
Supp. at 225.
15. See Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct 197, 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960);
Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 949-50.
16. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738,
742 (7th Cir. 1953); Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 950. But see United States v.
Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 n.13 (D.N.M. 1985) (defendant's utility in assisting
counsel in preparing case largely disappears after conviction).
17. See Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 950.
18. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra notes
11-12 and accompanying text.
19. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1979); S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3185.
20. See United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.N.J. 1934).
21. Id. ("Bail or qualified freedom was devised to meet these conflicting interests of
society and the individual.").
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A. Early Development of the Standards of Release
The standards applied in cases of bail pending appeal have always been

more stringent than those employed in determining pretrial release.22
This is largely because the presumption of the defendant's innocence disappears after conviction and sentencing.2 3
The first statute to address the issue of bail pending appeal was enacted

in 1866.24 In 1891, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 36(2)25 for
federal courts, which provided that for writs of error, the Justice or judge
presiding over the case "shall have power, . . . to admit the accused to
bail in such amount as may be fixed."'26 In Hudson v. Parker2 7 the Court

held that the rule recognized a person's right to bail "until he has been
finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort[,] . . . not only after
arrest 2and
before trial, but after conviction and pending a writ of
8
error."

Following Hudson, various interpretations of the rule emerged.2 9 For
example, one court held that bail would not be granted if the appeal was
brought solely for the purpose of delay,30 while another court deemed
bail proper "as best effects exact justice between the government and the
defendant .
,,3" Courts held that a presumptive right to bail pending
appeal existed absent exceptional circumstances. 3 2 By 1926, a well set22. See United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 n.13 (D.N.M. 1985); United
States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 789 (S.D. Fla. 1977). Compare 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3142(c) (West 1985) (judicial officer shall order pretrial release of defendant subject to
any necessary conditions to prevent flight or danger to community) with id. § 3143(b)
(judicial officer shall not order release pending appeal unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that defendant will not flee nor pose danger to community and provided defendant presents substantial question on an appeal not brought for delay).
23. United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 n.13 (D.N.M. 1985); see United
States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 792 (S.D. Fla. 1977); 3A C. Wright, supra note 3,
§ 767, at 120. Release on bail has been routinely granted to pretrial defendants in order
to give meaning to the initial presumption of innocence. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951). See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
24. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 69, 14 Stat. 172-73. This statute left the issue
of bail pending appeal to the discretion of the appropriate state courts, because there were
no writs of error from one federal court to another in criminal cases at that time. See
Duker, The Right to Bail: A HistoricalInquiry, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 33, 112 (1977). However,
at common law, determining bail pending appeal rested within judicial discretion. Id. at
112 n.503.
25. Sup. Ct. R. 36(2), 139 U.S. 706 (1891).
26. Id. This Rule was set forth after the establishment of the Circuit Courts of Appeals that same year. See Sup. Ct. R. 36(1), 139 U.S. 706 (1891).
27. 156 U.S. 277 (1895).
28. Id. at 285.
29. The Rule itself contained no requirement that the question on appeal have some
degree of merit, but the courts infused this idea into their interpretations. 3A C. Wright,
supra note 3, § 767, at 127 n.20.
30. See McKnight v. United States, 113 F. 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1902).
31. Exparte Harlan, 180 F. 119, 135 (5th Cir. 1909), aff'd, 218 U.S. 442 (1910).
32. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 12 F.2d 708, 709 (4th Cir. 1926) ("ft]here may be
unusual cases. . . that would warrant the court to hesitate in granting bail; but these are
exceptional cases"); Rossi v. United States, 11 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1926) ("there are
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tied criterion for granting bail was that the defendant's appeal could not
be frivolous. 3 While this new guideline placed the burden of demon-

strating frivolousness on the government,3' it marked the first step toward making a meritorious appeal a prerequisite for release.3 5
By 1934 the liberal attitude underlying the test had faded.3 6 In that
year, the Supreme Court amended Rule VI of the Rules of Criminal Appeal 37 to state: "Bail shall not be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the appeal involves a substantial question which should be
determined by the appellate court., 38 In applying the substantial question test, the courts defined "substantial" as "fairly debatable" 39 or
"fairly doubtful."' The leading cases also considered substantial those
questions that were new or novel4 1 or that "present[ed] unique facts not
plainly covered by the controlling precedents." 4 2 In addition, these
courts included any "important questions concerning the scope and

meaning of decisions of the Supreme Court,"'

3

or that were in conflict

among the circuits.' The opinion in Herzog v. United States45 also included questions for which there was "a school of thought, a philosophical view, a technical argument, an analogy, an appeal to precedent or to
reason commanding respect that might possibly prevail."4' 6 When the
rare cases in which bail may properly be denied"); McKnight v. United States, 113 F.
451, 453 (6th Cir. 1902) (if appearance can be assured by requiring bail money, "there is
no excuse for refusing or denying such relief").
33. See Duker, supra note 24, at 115. A leading case establishing this standard for
reviewing bail issues was United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (Butler, Circuit Justice
1926). Justice Butler stated that "if [the writs of error were] taken in good faith, on
grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable ... then petitioners should be admitted to
bail." Id. at 662.
34. See Duker, supra note 24, at 115.
35. Note, Bail Pending Appeal in Federal Court.: The Need for a Two-Tiered Approach, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 275, 278 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bail Pending Appeal].
36. See id. at 277.
37. See Crim. App. R. VI, 292 U.S. 663 (1934).
38. Id. at 664.
39. See, e.g., D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice
1950); United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.Alaska 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d
945 (9th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952); Warring v. United States, 16
F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Md. 1954); United States v. Goo, 10 F.LD. 337, 338 (D.Hawaii
1950).
40. See Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 281-82 n.4 (Jackson, Circuit Justice 1950) ("question should be substantial in the sense of fairly doubtful").
41. See Herzog v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955);
D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950).
42. D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950); see
United States v. Glazer, 14 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D. Mo. 1952), appealdismissed per curiam,
205 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1953).
43. D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950);
United States v. Glazer, 14 F.R1D. 86, 88 (E.D. Mo. 1952), appeal dismissed, 205 F.2d
421 (8th Cir. 1953).
44. See Herzog v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955).
45. 75 S.CL 349 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955).
46. Id. at 351. This criterion, according to Justice Douglas, considered the soundness
of the errors alleged by the defendant on appeal. See id; see also United States v. Iaeullo,
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identical rule was reenacted in 1946 as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2),4 7 the courts interpreted it to mandate placing the burden
of proof on the applicant rather than on the government. 48

In light of a renewed public and governmental concern for the crimi-

nal defendant's rights,4 9 a 1956 Amendment to the Rules of Criminal

Procedure5" allowed for release pending appeal "unless it appears that
the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." 51 This amendment greatly

liberalized the basis for granting bail. 2 Courts interpreted the new rule
as returning to the government the burden of proving that the defendant
had not met the minimum requirements for release. 3 Furthermore, it
was held that the standard "expresses a general attitude . . . [that] the
risk of incarceration for a conviction that may be upset is normally to be
guarded against by allowing bail unless the appeal is so baseless as to
deserve to be condemned as 'frivolous' or is sought as a device for mere

delay." 54 Thus, a denial of release was proper in only the most exceptional cases.55

B. The Bail Reform Act of 1966
The Bail Reform Act of 196656 manifested a continuing concern for
225 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1955) (agreeing with the observation in Herzog, but distinguishing on the facts).
47. Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a)(2) (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2275,
'2296-97 (amended 1956).
48. See United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.N.J. 1934), rev'd on other
grounds, 77 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1935); Bail Pending Appeal, supra note 35, at 278. The
Rule read in part:
Bail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari only if it appears that the case
involves a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate
court. Bail may be allowed by the trial judge or by the appellate court or by any
judge thereof or by the circuit justice.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a)(2) (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2275,
2296-97 (amended 1956).
49. Bail Pending Appeal, supra note 35, at 278.
50. Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a)(2), 350 U.S. 1021 (1956).
51. Id. This new standard completely supplanted the requirement of a "substantial
question." See id.
52. United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 76 S. Ct. 1068, 1069 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1956); Ward v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063, 1064-65 (Frankfurter, Circuit
Justice 1956); see Leary v. United States, 431 F.2d 85, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Tex.), aff'dper curiam, 338 F.2d 1005 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
53. See Binion v. United States, 352 U.S. 1028, 1029 (1957) (per curiam); Ward v.
United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063, 1065 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1956); United States v.
Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 338 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965); Bail Pending Appeal, supra note 35, at 278.
Although the government had the burden of proving lack of merit in the appeal, it was, of
course, the defendant's responsibility to identify the questions in the first place. See Bowman v. United States, 85 S. Ct. 232, 232 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1964).
54. Ward v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063, 1065 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1956).
55. See Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960).
56. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, §§ 2-6, 80 Stat. 214-17 (codified at
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the rights of criminal defendants.57 Under the Act, the rule for bail
pending appeal maintained the minimal requirements that the claim in
the defendant's appeal not be frivolous nor taken for delay. 58 Congress
added, however, that the defendant could also be detained if a risk of
flight or if danger to the community existed.59 The government had the
burden of proving that the defendant's appeal was frivolous, but the defendant had the burden of proving that he was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to society.' If the government failed to show that the defendant
should be detained, the statute required that the defendant be treated the
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (1982)), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, § 203, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976.
57. The House Report accompanying the 1966 legislation focused on considerations
of fairness to the defendant:
The purpose of [the Act] is to revise existing bail procedures in the courts of
the United States . . .in order to assure that all persons, regardless of their
financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to
answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the
ends of justice nor the public interest.
H.R. Rep. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2293, 2295.
In the past several years, the money bond system of bail has been attacked as unjust to
poor defendants. See Carbone, Seeing Through The Emperor'sNew Clothes: Rediscovery
of Basic Principlesin the Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L. Rev. 517, 518 (1983);
Harris, The Vested Interests of the Judge Commentary on Flemming's Theory of Bail,
1983 Am. Bar. Found. Res. J. 490, 493-94; Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 931.
The BRA of 1966 sought to remedy these inequities by deemphasizing money bonds and
providing instead for other, more flexible conditions of release. S. Rep. No. 225, supra
note 19, at 5, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3187-88 (discussing
Final Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, Aug. 17, 1981, at
50-51). For a list of the current conditions that can be placed on a release order, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 3142(c) (West 1985).
58. See BRA of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1982) (repealed 1984).
59. See id. Actually, the 1966 Act merely codified the factors that the courts had
considered previously. 3A C. Wright, supra note 3, § 767, at 131, 134; see, e.g., United
States v. Galante, 308 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1962) (defendant who had previously been a
fugitive and who had made frequent business and social trips outside U.S. was denied bail
pending appeal). Thus, the BRA of 1966 made little change in the liberal standards
practiced under prior law. 3A C. Wright, supra note 3, § 767, at 123.
According to the BRA of 1966, the possibility of flight or danger was not automatic
cause for detention. Release was to be ordered unless the judge reasonably believed that
"no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee
or pose a danger to any other person or to the community." BRA of 1966, 18 U.S.C
§ 3148 (1982) (repealed 1984). Thus, there was an obligation to impose conditions on the
defendant's release, where feasible, to prevent flight or danger, rather than to deny release
entirely. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979); United States
v. Harrison, 405 F.2d 355, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 974 (1969).
60. 3A C. Wright, supra note 3, § 767, at 124 n.9; see United States v. ValeraElizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85,
94 (3d Cir. 1979).
Originally, the full burden had been on the government. See 3A C. Wright, supra note
3, § 767, at 126; Leary v. United States, 431 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1970). In 1972, however, Rule 9(c) was added to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and provided that
"[the] decision as to release pending appeal shall be made in accordance with Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3148. The burden of establishing that the defendant will not flee or pose a
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same as a pretrial bail applicant.6"

The judicial interpretations of "frivolous" illustrate the liberality of the
standard. One court defined an appeal as frivolous "only if the applicant

can make no rational argument on the law or facts in support of his claim
for relief."62 Other courts, relying on the dictionary definition, considered an issue frivolous only where it presented "no reasonable possibility
of reversal, the word meaning of little weight or importance, not worth

notice, slight."' 63 For the most part, courts agreed that bail should be
denied only as a last resort,' even where the defendant posed a potential
danger to the community.65 The courts continued to resolve all doubts
in favor of the defendant. 6 6 Thus, the BRA of 1966 mandated a strong,
albeit rebuttable, presumption in favor of bail.67
danger to any other person or to the community rests with the defendant." Fed. R. App.
P. 9(c) (1972) (amended 1984) (emphasis added).
The Advisory Committee Note to that 1972 amendment added that the burden of
establishing that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay still rested with the government. See Fed. R. App. P. 9(c) advisory committee note (1972). The 1972 Amendment
to Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that the burden of proving
no risk of flight or danger to the community rests with the defendant, but is silent on
proof of a meritorious question. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(c) (amended 1984).
61. See BRA of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1982) (repealed 1984); see also United States
v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1979) (if the factors were found in defendant's
favor court must order release according to § 3146 for pretrial defendants); 3A C.
Wright, supra note 3, § 767, at 124-25 (the same conditions of release may be imposed
and the same factors taken into consideration in setting conditions).
62. Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 742 (9th Cir. 1965) (quoted in Dillingham v.
Wainwright, 422 F. Supp. 259, 261 (S.D. Fla. 1976)), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.
1977).
63. United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 740 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 338
F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965); United States v. Esters, 161
F. Supp. 203, 206 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (quoting Webster's Unabridged Dictionary).
64. See Government of V.I. v. Leycock, 678 F.2d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also United States v.
Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that under prior law, bail pending
appeal "was the rule, not the exception"); Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1153
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (alternatives to denying bail should be found); 3A C. Wright, supra note
3, § 767, at 128-29 (in most cases, release pending appeal should not be denied solely on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous).
65. See Sellers v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 36, 38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968) (must be
"kind of danger that so jeopardizes the public" that it can only be prevented by incarceration); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979) ("danger to the community posed by the defendant must be of such dimension that only his incarceration can
protect against it").
66. See Bail Pending Appeal, supra note 35, at 280; see, e.g., United States v.
Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 741
(N.D. Tex.), aff'dper curiam, 338 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951
(1965).
67. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3182, 3209; H.R. Rep. No. 1541, supra note 57, at 15, reprintedin 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2293, 2305.
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II. THE BAIL REFORM AcT OF 1984 AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER
THE CURRENT STANDARD FOR RELEASE

The 1984 amendment on bail pending appeal, section 3143(b)," dramatically changed the requirements for release. 69 The interpretations
that have emerged vary among the circuits7° and complicate the courts'
attempts to develop a practical standard for applying the new law.
A.

The Language of Section 3143(b)

Although considerations of flight, danger to the community, and unnecessary delay remain intact,7 ' Congress has replaced "[not] frivolous"
with "substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an

order for a new trial."72 In addition, the law no longer requires that bail

be granted unless certain requirements are satisfied. Instead, release is to

be denied unless there is an "affirmative finding that the chance for rever-

sal is substantial."7 3 The burden of proof is now indisputably on the
defendant. 74
The primary goal of Congress in departing from the previous, more
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(b) (West 1985).

69. Section 3143(b) reads in full:
(b) Release or detention pending appeal by the defendant.-The judicial officer
shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced
to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ
of certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or
pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released pursuant to section 3142(b) or (c); and
(2) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial
question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new
trial.
If the judicial officer makes such findings, he shall order the release of the
person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142(b) or (c).
Id.
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(b)(1) (West 1985).
72. See id. § 3143(b)(2).
73. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 27, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3182, 3210 (emphasis added).
74. See Fed. R. App. P. 9(c). The 1984 Act does not change Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(c)'s placement of the burden of proof for flight and danger on the defendant. See id. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
However, § 109 of the new BRA expressly reverses the rule stated in the advisory note
to the old Rule 9(c) that the burden of showing lack of merit or purposeful delay rests
with the government. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 27, reprintedin 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3210 n.86. Thus, the burden of showing that his appeal is
not taken for delay and "raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in
reversal or an order for a new trial" is now explicitly on the defendant. See United States
v. Affieck, 765 F.2d 944, 953 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Randell, 761
F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. CL 533 (1985); United States v. Powell, 761
F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283
(9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam).
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liberal approach was to create a presumption against release,7" and thus
reduce the availability of bail.7 6

B.

The Application of Section 3143(b)

The Third Circuit, in United States v. Miller," devised a four part test

for the requirements of release.7 8 According to Miller, a person shall be
detained unless: 1) the convicted defendant is not likely to flee 79 nor pose
any danger to another or to the community 0 while released; 2) the ap-

peal is not for the purpose of delay;81 and 3) the appeal raises a substan-

tial question of law or fact that, 4) if determined favorably to the

defendant on appeal, would be likely to result in reversal or an order for

a new trial.8 2 This last factor means that the question on appeal must be
75. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3182, 3209; United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (11 th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam); United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 24 (3d Cir. 1985).
76. See United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
77. 753 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985).
78. See id. at 23-24.
79. See id. at 24. For an example of a court's analysis of the flight potential for a
particular defendant, see United States v. DiMauro, 614 F. Supp. 461, 463-65 (D. Me.
1985). In DiMauro, the defendant averred that he was a long-time resident of the area,
that he had ties to the area because of a wife and son, and that he had employment in the
area at that time. Id. at 464. The court found that even if these factors were true, they
were outweighed by evidence that the defendant lacked personal character and was socially irresponsible, and thus, if granted release, the defendant would be a potential fugitive of the court. See id. at 464-65.
80. See Miller, 753 F.2d at 24. Safety to the community was an overriding concern
of Congress in enacting the entire Bail Reform Act. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19,
at 3, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3185. Thus, danger to the
community became a prime consideration. See id., reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3182, 3185; Kastenmeier & Beier, Bail Reform Revisited, 32 Fed. B. News & J.
82, 82 (Feb. 1985).
It has been recognized that the danger need not be a physical danger. United States v.
Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786,
792 (S.D. Fla. 1977); 3A. C. Wright, supra note 3, § 767, at 137. The defendant's propensity to commit crime may alone suffice. See Provenzano, 605 F.2d at 95; Miranda,442 F.
Supp. at 795 (potential for drug trafficking can be sole reason for denial of release after
conviction). Even the possibility of pecuniary harm has been held to be cause for detention. See United States v. Moss, 522 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (participation
in widespread check-cashing scheme while on parole is sufficient cause for detention),
aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 826 (1982); United States v. Parr, 399 F. Supp. 883, 888 (W.D. Tex.
1975) (pecuniary harm caused by misappropriation of public assets is sufficient danger to
deny release).
81. See Miller, 753 F.2d at 24. Little case law expands on the meaning of "for the
purposes of delay." However, at least one district court simply assumed that where a
substantial question was found, the defendant was pursuing the appeal "not for delay but
in order to obtain a reversal of her conviction." United States v. Hicks, 611 F. Supp. 497,
498 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (mem.). Similarly, Professor Wright commented that, although
the two requirements are stated separately, "it is difficult to conceive of a nonfrivolous
appeal that could be. . . characterized" as taken for purposes of delay. 3A C. Wright,
supra note 3, § 767, at 131.
82. See Miller, 753 F.2d at 23-24.
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so "integral to the merits of the conviction" that it would warrant a
change in the lower court's decision. 3 Thus, courts have developed an

objective two tiered approach to section 3143(b)(2): "substantial question" defines the level of merit required in the question, and "likely to

result in reversal or an order for a new trial" defines the type of question

that must be brought on appeal.8 4 Virtually all of the circuit courts ad-

dressing the issue agree with this analysis.8 5

Inevitably, situations arise in which a court must determine whether a
substantial question exists on appeal.8 6 Thus, to consider properly a re83. Id.; accord United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 953 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc);
United States v. DeMauro, 614 F. Supp. 4561, 466 (D. Me. 1985). A question could have
substantial merit, yet be considered "harmless, to have no prejudicial effect, or to have
been insufficiently preserved," and thus not likely to change the decision below. Miller,
753 F.2d at 23; see United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 522-23 (Ist Cir. 1985); Affleck,
765 F.2d at 953; United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane);
United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
Release should also be denied where an error may have been harmful, but would not
result in reversal of all counts for which the defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment. See Giancola, 754 F.2d at 900 (quoting Miller, 753 F.2d at 24); Ex parte Cohen,
191 F.2d 300, 300 (9th Cir. 1951).
84. See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining
United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985)).
The phrase "substantial question likely to result in reversal" created much confusion in
the courts. District courts were subjectively interpreting the words of the statute as requiring them to determine whether or not they are likely to be reversed on appeal. Lay &
De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 947; see, e.g., United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d
1020, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985); Miller, 753 F.2d at 22, 23. In adopting the objective two
tiered analysis, the Third Circuit rejected that interpetation. See Miller, 753 F.2d at 2223. First, the court stated that if the phrase were not read in this objective fashion, the
word substantial would be rendered superfluous. See id. at 23. As the Handy court
noted, "[a] statute should be construed so as to avoid making any word superfluous."
Handy, 761 F.2d at 1280; accord United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc). Second, the court reasoned that Congress could not have been so cynical as to require district courts to predict the likelihood of their own error. See Miller,
753 F.2d at 23. First, judges do not purposefully leave errors uncorrected. Id. Moreover, such a requirement would make a "mockery" of Fed. R. App. P. 9(b) which requires bail applications to be made first in the district courts. Handy, 761 F.2d at 1281.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Affieck, 765 F.2d 944, 952-53 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v.
Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227,
1230-31 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024
(5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 533 (1985); United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900-01 (11th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam). Recently, district courts have also followed this approach. See, eg., United
States v. DiMauro, 614 F. Supp. 461, 465-66 (D. Me. 1985); United States v. Andrade,
605 F. Supp. 1497, 1498 (D. Minn. 1985); United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322,
1329 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mer., 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985).
For arguments against the Miller analysis, see United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944,
954-55 (10th Cir. 1985) (McKay, J., dissenting); United States v. Giangrosso, 763 F.2d
849, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1239 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Gibson, J., dissenting); United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1219-20 (D.N.M.
1985).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 611 F. Supp. 497, 498 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (mer.)
(government does not contend that defendant will flee or pose danger, but only that no
substantial question exists); United States v. Caldwell, 605 F. Supp. 260, 261 (N.D. Ga.)
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quest for bail, courts must be aware of precisely how much merit is re-

quired for a question to be substantial. The substantiality requirement
has been defined differently among the federal courts.

Some courts-most notably the Third Circuit in Miller and the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Handy87-have defined "substantial" as fairly

debatable"8 or fairly doubtful.8 9 This restates the definition adopted by
courts with respect to the earlier use of "substantial question." 9 To remain even more faithful to that earlier judicial interpretation, these modem courts include as substantial those questions that are new or novel, 9'
that present unique facts not controlled by precedents,92 that involve the
"'scope and meaning of decisions of the Supreme Court,"9 3 and even
those that are acceptable by any different school of thought, philosophy
or the like. 94
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Giancola95 was the first circuit
court to adopt the Miller analysis but to reject the accompanying definition of "substantial." 96 The Giancola court espoused a more narrow definition. The court held that a substantial question must be a "close"
question or one "that very well could be decided the other way." 97 The
purpose of the Giancola definition was to limit the granting of bail by
restricting the scope of the Miller/Handy standard. 98

III.

THE PREFERABLE DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION"

A.

The CongressionalIntent Behind the 1984 Act

The basic purpose of the BRA of 1984 was to discard the less restric(court found no threat of flight nor danger to community), aff'd, 776 F.2d 989 (11 th Cir.
1985); United States v. Kenney, 603 F. Supp. 936, 939-40 (D. Me. 1985) (court chose to
address substantial question issue even after finding defendant failed to demonstrate unlikelihood of flight or danger); United States v. Hall, 603 F. Supp. 333, 335 (N.D. I11.
1985) (court chose to address substantial question issue without reaching issues of flight
and danger).
87. 761 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985).
88. See id.at 1283; United States v. Hicks, 611 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(mem.) (quoting D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice
1950)).
89. See United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985). See supra note 4.
90. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
91. See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950)); United
States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985).
92. See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950)); United
States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985).
93. See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950)).
94. See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1985).
95. 754 F.2d 898 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
96. See id.at 901.
97. Id.

98. See id. at 900-01.
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tive position of the 1966 BRA, which no longer satisfied the perceived
needs of the criminal justice system." With respect to bail pending appeal, the intention was not to eliminate release entirely,100 but to reduce
the number of cases in which release would be available. 10 1 The Senate
report accompanying the 1984 legislation stated that0 2the new presumption was to be against granting bail pending appeal.
Commentators have attributed the shift in Congress' attitude toward
bail to mounting demands from the public to be protected from dangerous criminals.10 3 Apparently alarmed at the high recidivism rate of defendants out on bail,"° the public expressed a desire for more restrictive

bail laws.'

Congress justified the need for stricter bail laws by attribut-

ing the high crime rate in part to defendants released on bail."

6

In re-

spouse to the public outcry, Congress decidedly tipped the balance
between the interests of the defendant and those of society in favor of
society's interests.'0 7
Congress emphasized the need to restrict post-conviction bail because
of "the basic principle that a conviction is presumed to be correct."'10
99. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 3, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3182, 3185-86; Speech by James I.K. Knapp, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., before the
Nat'l Conf. of the Nat'l Ass'n of Pretrial Servs. Agencies, at 1-2 (Oct. 7, 1985) (available
in the files of the Fordham Law Review).
100. United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam);
United States v.°Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985). However, at least one commentator believes that release pending appeal will, in practice, be eliminated because of the
defendant's difficult burden of proving negatives and because of the reluctance of trial
judges "to view appeals as meritorious-let alone substantial. . . ." See Kastenmeier &
Beier, supra note 80, at 83.
101. United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (1lth Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
102. See S. Rep. No. 255, supra note 19, at 26, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3182, 3209. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
103. Powers, supra note 13, at 420. Congress attempted to address these concerns
several times since 1969, but early endeavors at federal bills failed. See Lay & De La
Hunt, supra note 11, at 934. See generally Kennedy, A New Approach to Bail Release."
The Proposed Federal CriminalCode and Bail Reform, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 423 (1980)
(in favor of modifying bail reform to attack growing crime problem). Congress did, however, introduce in 1970 a new bail law for the District of Columbia that became a model
for the federal Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 210, 84 Stat. 473, 642-50 (1970)
(codified at D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1325(c) (1981)).
104. See Powers, supra note 13, at 420. One study, done several years ago, revealed
that approximately 15% of defendants released pending appeal are arrested again. This
rate is even higher than the rate for defendants released pretrial. See Note, Prevention
Detention: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 300, 326-27 (1971).
105. See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 80, at 82.
106. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 3, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3182, 3185; Lay & De La Hunt. supra note 11, at 937.
107. Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 953; Powers, supra note 13, at 420.
108. S.Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, 3182, 3210; see also H.R. Rep. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1970) (same
principle used in establishing stricter requirements for bail pending appeal in District of
Columbia). Thus, a presumption of guilt has replaced the presumption of innocence. But
see United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 955 (10th Cir. 1985) (McKay, J., dissenting)
(denying bail to class of individuals not finally adjudged guilty is unconstitutional).
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Consequently, Congress saw "no reason to favor release pending imposi-

tion of sentence or appeal." 1" 9 This presumption of guilt is justified be-

cause it is consistent with the sentencing judge's initial determination

that the defendant belongs in prison. " o The presumption of guilt is also

justified by the relatively low rate of reversal of district court convictions
each year."' Furthermore, letting convicted defendants out on bail despite the presumption of guilt may destroy any remaining deterrent effect
for future offenders." 2 This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing and appellate review." 3 In
addition, at the post-conviction stage, defendants face certain prison
sentences and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or
other release conditions."' Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of
this presumption might encourage frivolous and time-wasting appeals., 15

The legislative history of the 1984 Act gives little guidance on what is
meant by "substantial question."' ' When combined with the express
changes in statutory language, however, the legislative history supports

the contention that Congress intended to restrict instances of bail by in109. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 26, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3182, 3209; see H.R. Rep. No. 907, supra note 108, at 186.
110. See H.R. Rep. No. 907, supra note 108, at 187; accord United States v. Handy,
761 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1985) (Farris, J., dissenting); United States v. Miller, 753
F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985).
111. H.R. Rep. No. 907, supra note 108, at 186-87; see United States v. Greenberg, 772
F.2d 340, 341 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 300 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985).
112. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 26, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3182, 3209; see United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1985) (Farris, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 907, supra note 108, at 186-87); United States v.
Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985) (same).
113. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 19, at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3182, 3209. According to one circuit judge, the time between notice of criminal appeal and oral argument in the Tenth Circuit is approximately one year. See United
States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 961 (10th Cir. 1985) (Seymour, J., dissenting). Indeed,
granting release pending appeal may itself cause delays. Yankwich, Release on Bond by
Trialand Appellate Courts, 7 F.R.D. 271, 282 (1948); see Albanese v. United States, 75 S.
Ct. 211, 211 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1954).
114. United States v. Kenney, 603 F. Supp. 936, 939 (D. Me. 1985); United States v.
DiMauro, 614 F. Supp. 461, 464 (D. Me. 1985).
115. Although few appeals succeed, see supra note 111 and accompanying text, courts
very rarely find that a question on appeal is frivolous. See 3A C. Wright, supra note 3,
§ 767, at 128. It follows that unless a significantly stricter standard for the merit of the
question on appeal is used, convicted defendants will be encouraged to bring frivolous
appeals.
116. See Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 947; see also S. Rep. No. 225, supra note
19, at 26 (requiring, but not defining, "substantial question"), reprinted in U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3210. In addition, although prior to 1984 Congress had enacted
a provision for the District of Columbia courts identical to § 3143 of the BRA of 1984,
see D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1325(c) (1981), there does not appear to be any elaboration on
the meaning of "substantial question" in subsequent District of Columbia cases, nor in
the legislative history of the Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 907, supra note 108, at 186-87; Lay
& De La Hunt, supra note 11, at 947.
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creasing the level of merit required in the defendant's claim.'
By
changing the words of the BRA from "[not] frivolous" to "[involving a]

substantial question," Congress must have intended a significant change.
Thus, if the substantial question requirement is to carry out Congress'
intent to restrict bail, the courts must adopt a strict reading of
"substantial."

B.

"Close Question" as the Stricter Standard

The Miller and Handy courts applied the "fairly debatable" test in part
because it followed the interpretation given the same phrase by the earlier courts."1 Although this kind of historical analogy is appropriate in
some cases,' 19 wholesale adoption of the earlier interpretations would

frustrate the aim of the new BRA. 20 The early use of the fairly debata-

ble standard coincided with the practice of granting bail as a normal remedy."' At that time, any doubts about whether bail should be granted
would always be resolved in favor of the defendant." This is not Con-

gress' intended result, which is a presumption against release."2 The
policy behind the creation of the earlier definition and the current policy

on bail are incongruous, despite the use of the same phrase. It would
thus be improper to adopt the old definition without reservation.

For the same reason, the Handy court's reliance'

on the Supreme

Court habeas corpus case 2 ' where "substantial" was defined as "debatable among jurists of reason"' 2 6 was inappropriate. 2 7 In the habeas
corpus context, doubts as to granting or denying release on the appeal
117. The Senate report explaining the changes in the new Act specifically states that
requiring the courts to find affirmatively that the appeal raises a "substantial question of
law or fact" is meant to further restrict bail pending appeal. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra
note 19, at 26, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3210.
118. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1281-83. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
119. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1285 (Farris, I., dissenting) (majority's analogy to history
would be reasonable but for opposing policies at the two times). However, analogy to
prior common law interpretation can sometimes impede the ulitity of new statutes. As
Justice Cardozo noted, statutes can provide a "new generative impulse transmitted to the
legal system." Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 351 (1937).
120. Handy, 761 F.2d at 1285 (Farris, J., dissenting). See supra note 119.
121. See D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950).
122. See United States v. Iacullo, 225 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1955) (quoting Herzog v.
United States, 75 S.Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955)).
123. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1284 (Farris, J., dissenting); United States v. Powell, 761
F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. S938 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)); United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1218
(D.N.M. 1985). See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
124. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1281-82.
125. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
126. Id. at 893 n.4 (quoting Gordon v. Willis, 516 F. Supp. 911, 913 (N.D. Ga. 1980)).
127. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1285 (Farris, J., dissenting). To attack the majority's
reliance on habeas corpus cases defining substantial, Judge Farris uses an argument
analogous to that used by other circuits in attacking Handy's reliance on pre-1956 bail
pending appeal cases. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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are resolved in favor of the petitioner. 2 ' Thus, this presumption is inapposite to the presumption now mandated by Congress in the bail pending
appeal context.
It would also defeat the goals of the BRA of 1984 to include as substantial questions those appeals that present new or novel issues, or those
with no easily controlling precedents, as the Miller and Handy courts
suggest.129 First, such an appeal may be so clearly wrong that no court
would be compelled to address the question. 30 The Giancola court also

noted that, while there might be no controlling precedent in a particular
circuit, there may be no reason to believe that the circuit would deviate

from unanimous resolution of the issue by other circuits.' 3 ' The absence
of controlling precedent has been considered "only one factor" in determining whether the appeal raises a substantial question. 132 Thus, a nonfrivolous question could fit under one of the blanket categories espoused
by Miller and Handy but still not be substantial.' 33 To accept categorically such questions as substantial would contradict the design of section
3143(b) to limit bail to exceptional circumstances by opening the door to
a barrage of potentially insubstantial appeals.
Throughout the history of bail pending appeal, courts have often confused the definition of "fairly debatable" with "not frivolous." One Jus-

tice, for example, equated appeals that are "plainly not frivolous" with
'
questions "not free of doubt." 134
Other judges have stated that an appeal

is frivolous where "it presents no debatable question."' 3 5 Yet "substan-

tial question" must signify more than "not frivolous" for Congress'
change in statutory language to have any value.' 3 6 The Handy court,
128. Gordon v. Willis, 516 F. Supp. 911, 912 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (citing Jones v. Warden,
402 F.2d 776, 776 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam)).
129. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
130. United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); accord United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 299 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Austin, 614 F.
Supp. 1208, 1217 n.61 (D.N.M. 1985).
131. See United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam);
see also United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 299 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 n.61 (D.N.M. 1985).
132. See United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1985).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985) (question of
whether challenges to coconspirators' statements should be based on requirements of
Federal Rules of Evidence or of sixth amendment is not frivolous but not substantial
despite conflict in the circuits); United States v. Caldwell, 605 F. Supp. 260, 261 (N.D.
Ga.), aff'd, 776 F.2d 989 (11 th Cir. 1985) (question of court's discretion in determining
right to cross-examine jurors not frivolous, but insubstantial).
134. See D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1950).
135. United States v. Esters, 161 F. Supp. 203, 206 (W.D. Ark. 1958); United States v.
Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 740 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 338 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
136. See United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam);
see also United States v. Greenberg, 772 F.2d 340, 341 (7th Cir. 1985). See supra notes
116-17 and accompanying text. The difference between the two phrases was noted under
the BRA of 1966 as well. See Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1233 (Douglas,
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which suggests "fairly debatable" as a guideline, agreed that the term
"substantial question" mandates a stricter standard.' Yet the definition
fails to assure recognition of this distinction by the courts. In effect,
"fairly debatable" implies a standard comparable to "not frivolous."
The definition "close question" is far more responsive to the goals of
the 1984 Act. "Close question" implies the more stringent standard that
bail will be granted in fewer, and only in the strongest, cases.'
Courts

that have applied the "close question" standard recognize that it considers only those cases that "very well could be decided" in the defendant's

favor.'3 9 One court following this standard has found it to imply a requirement of "more than a 50% chance" that the defendant's argument
is valid."4 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit adds that a close question
means that the appeal must present a "substantial doubt" and not merely
a "fair doubt" about the outcome of the issue.' 4 ' Thus, while the Miller!
Handy definitions would not significantly change prior law, the Giancola
definition significantly departs from the old view, as the BRA of 1984
envisioned. 4 2
The "close question" definition does not by itself decrease the instances of bail pending appeal. The federal courts must adopt the "close
question" standard as interpreted by Giancola and its progeny.143 A substantial question should be one in which the defendant's argument raises
enough doubt that a reasonable court could as easily find in favor of the
defendant as for the prosecution. Thus, "close question" should signal to
the courts a very strict approach to bail pending appeal.
Circuit Justice 1971). Even in the habeas corpus context, "substantial" was held to require more than the absence of frivolousness. See Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 551
(9th Cir. 1977).
137. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1282 n.2.
138. See United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
139. United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see, eg., United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985); United
States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); United States v. Caldwell, 605 F. Supp. 260, 261 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 776 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit recently explained "close question" to mean that "the appeal could readily
go either way, that it is a toss-up or nearly so." United States v. Greenberg, 772 F.2d
340, 341 (7th Cir. 1985).
140. United States v. Cirrincione, 600 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 780 F.2d
620 (7th Cir. 1985).
141. See United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1985).
142. United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane). The court in Powell notes further that
even if the congressional policy on release seems unwise or unusually strict, it must be
complied with. See Powell, 761 F.2d at 1232.
143. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit noted that the
definition "close" might be "inexact." United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th
Cir. 1985) (en bane). Nonetheless, the court believed that "experienced judges and lawyers" could apply it properly without much difficulty. See id.
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Constitutionalityof the Strict Interpretation

In the past, laws restricting release have been challenged as violating
the eighth amendment to the Constitution. 1 4 A strict reading of "sub-

stantial question," however, raises no constitutional problems. It is
widely accepted that a convicted defendant has no constitutional right to

bail.145 The eighth amendment provision against "excessive bail"'146 has
been construed by the Supreme Court not to provide a right to release on

bail in all cases, "but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in
those cases where it is proper to grant bail."14 7 Nor does a right to bail
appear elsewhere in the Constitution.

Furthermore, it has long been recognized that the power to grant or
deny bail depends solely on statutory law. 148 Congress may freely restrict the categories of cases in which release shall be granted, 149 provided that it legislates reasonably and non-arbitrarily.'5 Thus, reading

"substantial question" to mean "close question" and inferring a very
stringent standard of review is not constitutionally infirm merely because
the rule would place a strict limit on release.1 5 '
CONCLUSION

By changing the language of section 3143(b), Congress made it clear
that bail pending appeal was not to be routinely granted. This Note does
not purport to state that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires the use of
144. See, e.g., United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 299-300 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant contended making bail pending appeal difficult to obtain violated excessive bail
clause of Constitution); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1165 (8th Cir. 1981) (court held
state law classifying sex offenses as non-bailable was unconstitutional), vacated as moot
per curiam sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982).
145. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952); Harris v. United States, 404
U.S. 1232, 1232 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971); United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292,
299-300 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Provenzano, 602 F. Supp. 230, 232 (E.D. La.
1985); United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 225-26 (D.N.J. 1934). Nor have courts
found a constitutional right to bail for pretrial applicants. See Duker, supra note 24, at
86-88.
146. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
147. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (emphasis added). Thus, the
purpose of the excessive bail clause is to limit the judiciary in setting reasonable conditions of bail, not to limit the power of Congress. See United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d
292, 299 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1330 (D.C. App.
1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). "Excessive bail" was defined by the
Supreme Court in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), as that "set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated" to assure the presence of an accused defendant. Id. at 5.
148. See United States ex. rel. Carapa v. Curran, 297 F. 946, 954 (2d Cir. 1924); Bongiovanni v. Ward, 50 F. Supp. 3, 4 (D. Mass. 1943); Duker, supra note 24, at 87.
149. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952); see Duker, supra note 24, at 86-87.
150. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot per
curiam sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982); Lay & De La Hunt, supra note
11, at 950-51.
151. Indeed, no federal court to date has found § 3143(b) to be unconstitutional in any
respect. On the contrary, the Eighth Circuit has held this section to be constitutional.
See United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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the word "close" in defining "substantial." However, in deciding release
pending appeal cases, federal courts must understand that the goal of the
Act is to decrease substantially the number of convicted defendants released on bail. Applied properly, the Giancola definition of close question is more responsive to that demand because it advocates a stricter
approach to bail pending appeal.
Debra L. Leibowitz

